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MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, personally
and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of THEDA E.
SCHDLZ,

;
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Appellant,

Case No. 880216

-vsLEE PULLEY, M. D. and FHP OF
UTAH, dba FHP MEDICAL CENTER,
OGDEN,

]
]
]

Defendants/
Respondents•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

ON APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
SECOND DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, DISTRICT JUDGE

JHBJgPICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is a timely appeal from an Order of the Second
Judicial District Court for Weber County, Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde presiding, which granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that this medical malpractice action was

2

barred by the statute of limitations.

(A copy of the lower

court's decision and order is found in the Addendum at n A H .)
Jurisdiction exists in this Court under § 78-2-2(3)(i).V

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Section 78-14-4 provides that a medical malpractice
action is barred unless the plaintiff or patient commences suit
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the injury.
The issue on this appeal is whether, under the standard
of review for the granting of summary judgment, the trial court
was correct in holding that this matter was barred by the statute
of limitations; that is whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff
or plaintiff's decedent had discovered their injury more than
two years before this action was filed.
DETERMTMATTVE STATUTE

The determinative statute is the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, § 78-14-4, which provides in
pertinent part that:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced

1

/

All statutory citations in this brief are to the Utah Code.
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within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence
....
(The complete text is found in the
Addendum at "B".)

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Disposition Below
This is a wrongful death and survival action alleging
medical malpractice

court granted defendants' motion

for summary judgmer

lad been commenced

more than two years after plaintiff's injury was

t should have

been discovered and that, therefore, the art ion

B

The Parties

Plaintiff, Miche

surviving daughter

and personal representative of her deceased mother, Theda E.
Schulz.

Defendant FHP-Utah is a health maintenance organization

with !' :K,\i 1 i t lew a In mi » lv.j Wasatch Front at which it provides
prepaid group medical and dental care to its subscribing members.
Defendant Lee Pulley, M. D. wir., employed br" [""HI a I a l l r e l e v a n t
times at FHP's Harrison Center in Ogden.

The Claims of Negligence
eated by D r , Pulley at FHP # s Harrison
Center on various occasions between June 29 and August 1, 1984,

for complaints of right shoulder and chest pain.

Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Pulley prescribed certain medications (unspecified in the Complaint) which caused a disease known as "necrotizing vasculitis."2/

[Sfifi, generallyr Complaint, R-l].

On

August 1, 1984, Mrs. Schulz was hospitalized at St. Benedict's
Hospital in Ogden for complications arising from this disease
and from them she died there on October 30, 1984 at the age of
53.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Pulley negligently prescribed
medications which caused the vasculitis, failed to diagnose the
onset of the vasculitis, failed to adequately treat the vasculitis, and failed to obtain Mrs. Schulz's informed consent to the
treatment that he did render.
D.

The Pacta as to the Limitations Issue

This action was commenced on January 14, 1988. Therefore, under § 78-14-4, it is barred if plaintiff or plaintiff's
decedent knew,

2/

or reasonably

should have known,

of the legal

A rare, degenerative inflammation of the vascular system
which can lead to a variety of complications including kidney
failure, skin lesions, joint pain, lung failure, inflammation
of the heart and pericardium, peripheral nerve involvement,
encephalopathy, and gastrointestinal bleeding. K.

isseibacher, Harrison's Principles gf internal Medicine,

pp. 351-5? 1342-3 (9th Ed. 1980).
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injury

HI jt: before January 1 3f 1986.

Defendants' position,

and the position of the lower court, is that discovery occurred
not later than December

"i' „ l.,:nM. The undisputed facts rele-

vant to the discovery issue are these:
1.
ile lined i1

Al 1 defendants are "health «:are providers*" as
, ll'1 • 1.4- J \ I) and this Is a "malpractice action against

health care providers" as defined in * 7 8-14-3(29).

Therefore,

the applicable stat 111,e of. 1i m • t 11 Loris is <t »H- 14-4 , f R-- 13JP not
disputed by plaintiff, hence, admitted under District Court Rule
2.8(d)].
The date of the alleged negligent medical care
by defendants was between June 29 and August 1, 1984.
1 5, R-2 |

•
3.

[R-l].

'

•

•

[Comp] ai nt,

••

The Complaint was filed on January 14, 1988.

(Thus, the four-year statute nf repose i . i.r re I evfinf , )
In the ml ate summer" of 1984, while she was hospi-

4.

talized at St. Benedict's Hospital, Mrs. Schulz hired an Ogden
lawyer, James R. Hasenyager, to "Innk into I MM l.i ts surrounding
treatment at FHP Hospital (sic)."

[Hasenyager Affidavit, J5

1 and 2, R-55].
5.

Mr.s. ScihuLz executed a "Medical Release" for the

release of her FHP medical records to Mr. Hasenyager on September
20, 1984.

[R-33, % 5, R- I 7; unci i Sfi

- 6 -

"Medical

Release" for Mrs. Schulz's records from FHP was signed by plaintiff on December 5, 1984.
6.

[R-33, 1 6, R-14; undisputed below].

Mi*. Hasenyager went ahead and gathered the medical

records on Mrs. Schulz, as well as medical literature on vasculitis, "over the next few months."

[Hasenyager Affidavit, J 3,

R-55].
7.

Mrs. Schulz died in St. Benedict's Hospital on

October 30, 1984.
8.

[Complaint, 1 5, R-2]. 3 /

Before Mrs. Schulz's death, Mr. Hasenyager had

the case reviewed by a pharmacist at the Department of Pharmacy
at the University of Utah, Ms. Susan Stephenson.
Deschamps Affidavit, J 4,' R-46].

[Michelle

Ms. Stephenson's letter of Octo-

ber 23, 1984, informed Mr. Hasenyager that vasculitis would
rarely, if ever, be caused by the drugs at to which he had made
inquiry.

[R-49]. A copy of Ms. Stephenson's letter to Mr.

Hasenyager was received by plaintiff before her mother's death.
[Deschamps Affidavit, f 4, R-46].
9.

Following the October 30, 1984 death of her mother,

and despite the Stephenson letter, plaintiff still "felt strongly

3

/

The pertinent statute of limitations is that for medical
malpractice actions, not that for wrongful death actions.
Thus, the two-year period runs from the date of discovery,
not of death. SSS., § 78-14-3(29).
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that a competent specialist should review the records to see if
there was any connection between the treatment given by FHP Hospital (sic) and the death of my mother."

[Deschamps Affidavit, f

5, R-46].
10.

On December 31, 1984, Mr. Hasenyager served a

"Notice of Intent to Commence a Lawsuit" on defendants in accordance with § 78-14-8.V
11.

[R-16, 56].

The Notice of Intent stated, among other things,

that:
(a) The estate of Theda Schulz intended to commence
an action for medical malpractice against FHP and Dr.
Pulley;
(b) The nature of the claim was that defendants
"negligently and carelessly failed to immediately withdraw Theda Shulz (sic) from all medications capable
of causing vasculitis which developed and led directly
to her death" and that the defendants "failed to immediately start her on the appropriate steroid therapy";
and,

4

/

Service of a Notice of Intent is complete upon proper mailing.
§ 78-14-8.
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(c)

That a "Dr. Yenchinh" (sic-Yenchick) "finally

instructed Mrs. Shulz (sic) to cease taking all medications except Tylenol #3 when [on July 23, 1984] he
diagnosed Mrs. Shulz (sic) as suffering front vasculitis
caused by a drug reaction."

[R-16 and 17]

(A copy

of this document is found in the Addendum at "C".)
12.

Mr. Hasenyager had another expert review the case

in the spring of 1985, Dr. Gary Gordon, of the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine. Dr. Gordon reviewed the records
and informed Mr. Hasenyager that "there was not a cause of
action."

[Hasenyager Affidavit, f 6, R-56].
13.

Mr. Hasenyager then told plaintiff that, in his

opinion, there was "no case," and closed his file shortly thereafter.

[Deschamps Affidavit, ] 5, R-46; Hasenyager Affidavit,

1 7, R-56].
14.

Plaintiff "continued to feel uneasy about the

circumstances surrounding [her] mother's death" and "wanted a
second opinion" and so hired her present counsel, David A. Reeve,
at an unstated later date.
15.

[Deschamps Affidavit, 1 8, R-46].

Mr. Reeve had a Dr. Howard Ravenscraft review

the case in the spring of 1986. Dr. Ravenscraft was of the
opinion that, after all, defendants had been negligent in the
treatment of Mrs. Schulz.

[Ravenscraft Letter, R-51].

9

16.

Mr. Reeve then filed a second Notice of Intent on

June 16, 1986 [R-20], a third one on January 13, 1987 [R-23],
went through the prelitigation hearing panel process, and filed
the Complaint on January 14, 1987.5/
17.

Plaintiff now claims that she was never informed

by Mr. Hasenyager of his December 31, 1984, Notice of Intent
[Deschamps Affidavit, f 7, R-46] and that the first time she
"knew" that her mother's death was caused by defendants' negligence was in May 1986.

[Deschamps Affidavit, 1 13, R-48].

SUMMARY QF ARCTfffiET
Plaintiff, in having "strong concerns" and feelings
of "unease" about the care rendered by defendants, by hiring an
attorney, having that attorney hire an expert, having that
attorney investigate the claim, and knowing of the unexplained
and untimely death of her mother, as a matter of law had sufficient knowledge to have discovered her legal injury more than

5

/

Respondents take issue with Mr. Reeve's contention that he
filed the second Notice of Intent because he was "unaware"
of Mr. Hasenyager's first Notice of Intent. There is no
record evidence to support this claim. Whether successive
notices of intent can have the effect of tolling the statute
of limitations need not be addressed because plaintiff's
position is that she did not discover until May 1986, within
the two-year period, and defendants' position is that she
did by December 31, 1984, before the second Notice.
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two years before she commenced this action on January 14, 1988.
Certainty through obtaining a confirming expert's opinion is
not a precondition to discovery; inquiry knowledge will suffice.
Even if Ms. Deschamps did not discover her legal injury
more than two years prior to the commencement of this action,
her first lawyer, James Hasenyager, did, as is evidenced by his
December 31, 1984 Notice of Intent, and the knowledge of her
lawyer is, as a matter of law, imputed to plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
I.
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE IS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST

FAgpRABLE TO PLAIMTIFT, THERE is NO GENUINE ISSUE
ON WHETHER SHE BAP DISCOVERED HRR T.fiGAL INJURY MORE
THAN TWO YEARS BEFORE THIS ACTION WAS COMMENCED
Plaintiff in substance contends that she did not and
could not know of her legal injury until she obtained a medical
doctor's opinion that there had been negligence on the part of
defendants. The lower court felt otherwise:

"I hold that one

discovers the legal injury when there are facts sufficient to
show that an injury exists, its cause, and the possibility of
negligence, and not when one finally finds an expert willing to
testify that suspicions of negligence finally have merit."

[R-

87] Thus, the issue is whether discovery of a legal injury in
a medical malpractice action is contingent upon a plaintiff obtaining a favorable expert witness.
- 11

That requires an analysis of Foil v. Ballinger. 601
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) and its progeny.

Foil, of course, held

that the term discovery of "injury" in § 78-14-4 meant discovery
of both the physical injury and of the negligence which caused
the injury.

That is, the two-year limitations period does not

commence to run until the injured person knows or should know
both that he has sustained an injury and that this injury was
caused by negligent action.
Our inquiry here is an epistemological one:

When does

one "know" that an injury was caused by medical malpractice?
Is it "certainty" knowledge or is it "inquiry" knowledge?

A

spectrum of the degrees of knowledge between certainty and ignorance might be defined:
1.

Upon a plaintiff's jury verdict (which could be

assumed to validate plaintiff's expert's opinion);
2.

Upon a plaintiff obtaining an expert opinion of

negligence, short of trial;
3.

Upon a plaintiff having enough of a "strong con-

cern" and "suspicion" of negligence to hire an attorney to investigate the possibility of negligence, obtain medical records,
have expert reviews, and hire another attorney when the first
withdraws;

- 12 -

4.

Upon a plaintiff having a general feeling of dis-

satisfaction about the medical care received, which dissatisfaction is not yet strong enough to warrant his going to see an
attorney;
5.

Upon a plaintiff having suffered a physical injury,

but having no suspicion of negligence and attributing his injury
to happenstance or unavoidability.
Foil makes clear that the fifth and lowest degree of
knowledge is insufficient to constitute discovery and, perhaps,
the same can be said for the fourth.

Plaintiff's position is

that the second degree of knowledge, "obtaining an expert
opinion," is the minimal level needed for discovery.

Defendants'

position is that the third degree, "strong suspicions of negligence which lead to action19 is enough.
The purpose behind the knowledge requirement of the
discovery rule is to prevent the loss of a cause of action before
a potential plaintiff has an opportunity to become aware of the
existence of that cause of action.

Foil at 147 and S£S# Reiser

v, Lohner. 641 P.2d 93, 102-3 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J. dissenting).

Once the requisite level of knowledge is achieved, a plain-

tiff is granted

a two-year

period,

subject to the

statute of

repose, to act upon that knowledge, generally by hiring an
attorney to investigate the potential claim.

13

That investigatory

period allows the patient an opportunity to make a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry.

However, the law does not contemplate delay

of the commencement of this investigatory period until such time
as plaintiff obtains a favorable expert opinion.

Were that the

case, a plaintiff could delay obtaining an expert's confirming
opinion and the limitations period would be extended indefinitely
by that simple device.

The two-year investigatory period is

the time when plaintiff should, among other things, pursue her
claim by hiring an attorney and finding an expert.

But the start

of this investigatory period is not postponed until investigation
is completed.
In plaintiff's view, no one can "know" of a legal injury
until they find a compliant expert witness.

A lawyer can be

hired; he can file a notice of intent; experts can be hired and
fired; lawyers can be hired and fired; indeed, a suit can be
filed, but there can be no "discovery11 until a patient's suspicions, no matter how strong, are confirmed through expert analysis.
This is not what "discovery" means.

Decisions since

Eoii have made clear that "inquiry" knowledge is sufficient.
For example, in Hove v. McMaster. 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) this
Court held that a malpractice claim was barred where a plaintiff
was, or should have been, aware of the "possibility" of negligence

14

more than two years before she filed suit.

621 P.2d at 696-697.

Ms. Hove, like plaintiff, asserted that she could not have been
aware of her legal injury until a physician diagnosed her condition as resulting from defendant's acts. The Court rejected that
contention:

"Plaintiff could be expected to have recognized

the possibility that the recurring discomforts were the result
of the injection and that a proper injection would not have caused
the alleged injury."

(emphasis added)

621 P.2d at 696. See.

alSO., Duardan v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F. Supp., 781, 783,

n. 1 (D. Utah 1987) for an analysis of the Hsse. decision from a
local federal court. 6/
While, as Appellant indicates, it is certainly true that
Hove was before the Court on a broader standard of review, nevertheless, the significance of the case is that this Court recognized the

legal principle

that knowledge of

a possibility of

negligence is sufficient to constitute discovery, regardless of
the standard of review.

*/

Defendants agree that plaintiff did

Appellant's statement that "the Utah Supreme Court doesn't
need help from a federal court to interpret its own opinions"
[Appellant's Brief at p. 18] is inappropriate. Of course
defendants do not contend that the decisions of the federal
courts on matters of state law are binding upon this Court.
However, well-reasoned opinions on Utah law from federal
courts, while not dispositive, can be enlightening.

15

not have the possibility of negligence "confirmed11 until she
obtained Dr. Ravenscraft's opinion in May 1986, but neither can
plaintiff dispute that she had "strong concerns" about those
possibilities at a much earlier date.

The issue is purely a

legal one; whether these admitted concerns about defendants'
care, which lead to further action are enough, or whether an
expert's confirming opinion is also necessary.
In another local federal court decision, Haraett v.
Limbura. 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) Judge Winder noted that:
Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal determination of negligence is not necessary to
start the statute of limitations. Rather
the crucial question is whether the plaintiff
is aware of the facts that would leave a
reasonable person to conclude that he may
have a cause of action against a health care
provider (citations omitted).
Those facts
include 'the existence of an injury, its
cause and the possibility of negligence.'
598 F. Supp. at 155.
Mrs. Hargett had contended that she did not discover
the possibility of a legal injury until she consulted a lawyer.
This, the court noted, confused "legal injury" with a legal conclusion of negligence.

Id. at 154-155 and seer "Developments

in Utah Law," 1980 Utah Law Rev, at 709-710:

"It is unlikely

that the court intended to make running of the statute contingent
on the plaintiff's receipt of expert advice from either a doctor
or lawyer; yet, the term 'legal injury' may leave the court open

16

to arguments that a layman could not have been aware of this
cause of action without such advice."
The standard was further clarified by this Court in a
more recent decision, Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).
In that case, an evenly-divided Court partially upheld a summary
judgment entered in favor of defendant doctors on a limitations
issue. Plaintiff, Mrs. Brower, had received a puncture in her
right thigh during a hysterectomy.

This unexplained complication

was held to be enough, as a matter of law, to place plaintiff
on notice that she had received a legal injury.
1337.7/

744 Utah 2d at

That is, "inquiry* knowledge may

be enough, at least as to serious and unexplained complications.
It is, as Appellant points out, true that requiring
potential plaintiffs to act upon inquiry knowledge might encourage
malpractice suits to be commenced before confirmation of the
suspected malpractice through expert review.

That, after all,

Appellant is likely to seize upon the reference in Brower
on the utility of a separate limitations trial in medical
malpractice cases as indicating that she also should have
a trial. But surely Brower cannot be read to mean that Rule
56 is henceforth repealed as to limitations issues in medical
cases, that the trial remedy and the summary judgment remedy
are equally attractive to defendants, or that there must
always be a trial on a limitations issue, no matter how
clear the case.

17

is the inevitable result of a statute of limitations.

It serves

as a compromise between the interests of defendants in having
claims filed while evidence and memories are fresh and the interests of plaintiffs in having a reasonable period of time in
which to sue.

There may be harsh results, although in this case

it is hardly so since Mr. Hasenyager could have filed a complaint
before his withdrawal in the spring of 1985, or at least advised
plaintiff of the wisdom of doing so. 8 /
If this Court is of the opinion that "certainty" knowledge is required for discovery, then the lower court should be
reversed,

since on the facts

assumed for

the purposes of the

motion for summary judgment plaintiff did not "know" for certain
that defendants had been negligent until she obtained a favorable
expert opinion in May 1986.

If, on the other hand, this Court

feels that "inquiry" knowledge is sufficient, then the lower

8

/

Defendants are aware of no Utah case requiring a plaintiff
to obtain a favorable expert opinion prior to filing a complaint, at the peril of violating Rule 11, although many
health care providers would applaud such a requirement.
Realistically, an attorney's certificate that "to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a
reasonable inquiry" that the complaint is "well-grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law" often means merely
that an attorney has his own suspicions regarding negligence
after investigation, files his complaint to protect the
limitations issue, then locates a testifying expert.

18 -

court's decision should be affirmed, since by December 31, 1984,
plaintiff's decedent had been told that the vasculitis was caused
by a "drug reaction" [R-17], that plaintiff's decedent had hired
an attorney to investigate the claim, that this attorney did,
in fact, investigate the claim and hire an expert pharmacist.
Further, by that date plaintiff's mother had died from her disease, and, following the death of her mother, plaintiff had executed another release for medical records and, thus, indicated
her intention to continue on with the investigation even after
the unfavorable opinion of the expert pharmacist.

After her first

attorney served his Notice of Intent on December 31, plaintiff's
"strong concerns" about defendants' care continued and she hired
another attorney after the first withdrew.

If this is not "in-

quiry" knowledge, nothing is.
II.
EVEM I F PLATWPTTV matfJVrr.V WAD WOT DISCOVERED HER
T.BC1T. TlLTqRY^jngR LAWYER HAD. AMD THAT KNOWT.KD<TK Tff
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE IMPUTED TO PLAINTIFF

Let it be assumed that neither plaintiff nor her mother
discovered the legal injury outside the limitations period. The
December 4, 1984

Notice of Intent signed by James Hasenyager as

attorney for plaintiff makes the same allegations that plaintiff now asserts in her Complaint.
are no material differences.

(Addendum at "C") There

If plaintiff had herself signed

19

the Notice of Intent, she could hardly now claim with any plausi
bility that she then had no "knowledge" of defendants' negligence.9/

She alleges, however, Mr. Hasenyager never told her of

the Notice of Intent and, thus, that it has no relevance on when
she discovered her legal injury.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, she is bound by what Mr.
Hasenyager knew.

A client, as principal, is bound by the acts

of her attorney, as agent, within the scope of his actual
authority, whether express or implied, or within the scope of
his apparent authority.

5SS, RUSSSll Y. Mftrtell, 681 P.2d 1193,

95 (Utah 1984); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc.r 696 P.2d 645, 649
(Calif. 1985); Alt v. Krueaer. 663 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Haw. App.
1983).

Otherwise, a client could always claim that while her

attorney might have known or done something, she did not, and
thus she could not be bound by what her attorney knew or did.
Further, noNotice to an attorney of matters within the scope of
his representation is notice to his client.

Haller v. Wallisr

573 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Wash. 1978); Lanae v. Hickman. 544 P.2d

9/

Although it would be entirely consistent with her position
that there cannot be discovery until a favorable expert
opinion is obtained.
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1208, 1209 (Nev. 1976); DjcKman V, DeMoss, 660 P.2d 1 (Colo.
App. 1982).
Whether or not Ms. Deschamps herself had knowledge of
her legal injury by December 31, 1984, her attorney did, and
that knowledge is imputed to her. There is, of course, a duty
on the part of an attorney to inform his client of material developments in the client's affairs. SSS., Rule 1.4, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah state Bar (January 1, 1988) and
Ethical Consideration 9-2 of Canon 9, Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar (effective before January
1, 1988).

If Mr. Hasenyager did not inform plaintiff of the

Notice of Intent, it might mean that Ms. Deschamps has a remedy
against him for his failure to do so, but it does not mean that
his knowledge and acts are not imputed to her.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants should be affirmed.
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DATED this /1'~** day of October, 1988.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondents

Stewart M. Hanson, <fr., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.

Original Signature under Rule
27(c):

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.# Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief
of Respondents was served this

of October, 1988, by

depositing them in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
David E. West, Esq.
David A. Reeve, Esq.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorneys for Appellant
1300 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

<rx>Mr^gr (<**+**
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ADDENDUM

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
SECTION 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, AS AMENDED).
"NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE A LAWSUIT," DECEMBER 31, 1984.

"A"

!

folS

?:i'. n * : tS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WBBBJ^ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, personally,
and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Theda Schulz,
RULING ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LEE PULLEY, M.D., and FHP OF
UTAH dba FHP MEDICAL
CENTER, OGDEN,

Case No.

1100-88

Defendants*

Defendants1

motion

for

summary

judgment

presents

the

question of whether or not this action filed on January 14, 1988,
was filed within the time limit proscribed by Section 78-14-4.
Theda Schulz died in late October, 1984*

Prior to her

death she had contacted Attorney James Hasenyager to investigate
the facts surrounding her illness, later diagnosed as vasculitis.
Schulz1

Following

death,

Attorney

Hasenyager

continued

to

investigate the matter and had the case reviewed by experts.

On

December 31, 1984, Mr. Hasenyager served a notice of intent to
commence

lawsuit

on defendants

on behalf

of

this plaintiff

in

which he alleged the same claims and theories of negligence that
are now alleged in this complaint.
that

the

concerned,

case

did

not

have

Hasenyager later determined

merit.

Plaintiff,

still

hired current counsel, who had other experts

being
review
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Ruling on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment
Case No. 1100-88

the records, and in May of 1986, obtained

the opinion

of an

expert that there was a causal relationship between the acts of
FHP Hospital and Schulz* death.
was

this

time, May

It was plaintiff's claim that it

of 1986, when

they

opinion that the statute started to run.

received

a favorable

That is, they did not

discover the injury until she found an expert willing to testify
to negligence.
The basic question

is an

interpretation

"legal injury" as used in Foil v. Ballinger.

of the term

I hold that one

discovers the legal injury when there are facts sufficient to
show that an injury exists, its cause, and the possibility of
negligence, and not when one finally finds an expert willing to
testify that the suspicions of negligence finally have merit.

In

view of plaintiff's attorney, Hasenyager, filing the notice of
intent to sue, which sets out the facts showing the existence of
an

injury,

its

cause, and

the

allegation

or possibility

of

negligence, I fail to see how the commencing of the running of
the statute could possibly be later than the date of the filing
of that notice.

It is my opinion that the latest possible date

that the statute of limitations would commence to run would be
December 31, 1984.

It could possibly have been sooner than that

date, but not later.

It is my opinion that the statute of

limitations in this matter had run when this action was filed and
is, therefore, barred.
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Ruling on Defendants1 Motion
for Summary Judgment
Case No. 1100-88

D e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment i s granted,
DATED t h i s

a^day

of A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 .

RONALD 0 . HIDE," Judge' '

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h i s
true

and

correct

copy

of

the

<5D

foregoing

day of A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 , a
Ruling

on

Defendants'

Motion f o r Summary Judgment was served upon t h e f o l l o w i n g :
David E. West
David A. Reeve
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f
1300 Walker Center
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
F r a n c i s J . Carney
SDITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorney f o r Defendants
175 South West Temple, 7th f l o o r
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101

lriJ-±

PAULA CARR, S e c r e t a r y

.-IT-'
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. (1356)
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581)
SDITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
175 South West Temple
Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, Personally,
and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of THEDA E.
SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEPENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

-vsLEE PULLEY, M. P. and PEP OF
UTAH dba PHP MEDICAL CENTER,
OGDEN,

Civil No. CV-1100-88

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde presiding, on April 18, 1988, for hearing on defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on the ground that this action is, as a matter
of law, barred by the applicable statute of limitations, § 78-144, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).

Plaintiff was represented

by David A. Reeve, Esq.; defendant by Francis J. Carney, Esq.

The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits
submitted on behalf of the parties, having heard the arguments of
counsel, having entered its memorandum decision on April 22, 1988,
and being otherwise advised in the premises, finds that there are
no genuine issues of material fact on the limitations issue and
for the reasons set forth in its memorandum decision grants defendants1 motion, and enters judgment as follows:
It is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that summary judgment in
favor of defendants, Lee Pulley, M. D. and FHP-Utah and against
plaintiff, Michelle Deschamps, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of Theda Schultz, shall be, and hereby
is, entered, no cause of action.

MADE AND ENTERED this

~y
•*/

day of ApiLl'J
AuYLlJ 1988.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE RONALD C^HYDE

D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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"B"

78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions —' Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injur}-, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body.
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs: and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and sh^ll apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law: but any action which under former law
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.

»c»

TO:

FHP Utah
3291 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, UT
84401
Dr. Lee Pulley
FHP Utah
3291 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, UT
84401.
FHP Utah
323 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT
Pursuant to Section 78-14-8 Utah Code Annotated, please

take notice that Michelle Deschamps, personal representative
for the estate of /Theda Shulz) intends to commence a civil
action against you for medical malpractice leading to the
death of Theda Shulz.
1.

NATURE OF CLAIM;

The above-named defendants negligently

and carelessly failed to immediately withdraw Theda Shulz
from all medications capable of causing vasculitis when she
began to exhibit symptoms

indicative of vasculitis which

developed and lead directly to her death.

This claim is in

the nature of a wrongful death claim arising from medical
malpractice.
2.

PERSONS INVOLVED:

Theda

Shulz, now deceased. Dr. Lee

Pulley and FHP Utah, its agents or employees.
3.

DATE, TIMS AND PLACE OF OCCURRENCE;

Ogden, Utah between

6/29/84 and 10/30/84 when Theda Shulz died at St. Benedict's
Hospital.
A.

CIRCUMSTANCES;

June 29, 1984 Theda Shulz was given

tice to Commence Suit
eda Shulz
ge 2

.'dications capable of causing the onset of vasculitis.

By

aly 9, 1984 both of her feet were swollen and had developed
burning pain.

On July 12, 1984 both feet still burned and

he feeling was absent in the left foot.

Symptoms continued

o worsen with loss of feeling up both legs until on July
:3, 1984 Dr. Yenchinh finally instructed Mrs. Shulz to cease
:aking all medication except Tylenol $3 when he diagnosed
Irs. Shulz as suffering from vasculitis caused by a drug
reaction.
As a result of complications arising out of the
vasculitis Mrs. Shulz died on October 30, 1984.
5.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT: That Dr. Lee pulley

and FB? Utah, its agents or employees negligently and care*
lsssij provided iredieal care and treatment to Theda Shulz in
that they did not immediately withdraw Mrs. Shulz from all
medications capable of causing vasculitis when she first
began to exhibit signs of developing vasculitis and negigently and carelessly failed to immediately start her on the
appropriate steroid therapy.
6.

DAMAGES SUSTAINED:

Substantial medical costs, severe

physical and mental pain and suffering and death.

Loss of

the love, care, society, companionship and counsel of Theda
Shulz.

^

